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BOOK REVIEW
COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL

SYSTEMS. By James Eisenstein.* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

1978. Pp. xi, 264. $15.00.
Although more than fifty percent of the attorneys employed by the Department of Justice are assigned to the ninety three United States Attorneys'
offices throughout the country, there has been a scarcity of scholarly analysis
and literature devoted to their activities., James Eisenstein, a political scientist
long interested in studying U.S. Attorneys, has produced in this volume the
first major extensive analysis of these Justice Department attorneys. Relying
heavily upon his own (nearly 200) interviews with U. S. Attorneys, judges
and others familiar with the work undertaken by U. S. Attorneys from 1965
to 1967 and from 1970 to 1971, as well as supplementary data acquired from
mailed questionnaires, published sources of materials, and federal documents,
Eisenstein has written a work that in itself goes a great distance toward
filling this unfortunate gap in the literature.
Although the ninety three U.S. Attorneys' offices scattered across the
country are charged with significant legal and public policy responsibilities,
the activities are unfamiliar generally to all except those who regularly litigate
in the federal courts. As members of the Department of Justice, U. S. Attorneys
are supposed to implement a consistent national policy because they represent
the federal government in its criminal and civil litigation. Yet U.S. Attorneys
generally have strong local ties because they are residents of the district in
which they serve and their selection is influenced by local political forces.
Senators play a particularly significant role in this selection process. On the
other hand, it is an unwritten principle in American politics that each new
administration names its own corps of U.S. Attorneys, which almost always
belongs to the President's party, and the job is therefore seen as being a
temporary way station to either a further litigation career or promotion to
the federal bench or other high political office. The interplay between these
divergent influences, some from Washington, others from the district itself,
produces a complex relationship which Eisenstein undertakes to unravel
through the application of social science techniques.

*Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University.
"Trial Attorney, Antitrust Division, Justice Department, Washington, D.C.; A.B., University of California (Riverside), 1966; M.A., University of California (Santa Barbara), 1967;
Ph.D., 1970; J.D., Capital University, 1977. The views expressed herein represent those of
the author and not the Department of Justice.
1. Some helpful exceptions to this void in the literature are H. JAcoB, JUSTcE IN
AMERICA 75-79

(2d ed. 1972);

W.

SEYMOUR,

UNITED

STATES

ATrORNEY

(1975);

Rabin,

Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036 (1972); Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and
Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW & CONT. PROB. 64 (1948); J. EISENSTEIN, POLMCS AND THE
LEGAL PROCESS 36-42, 143-70 (1973).
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The most basic characteristic of U.S. Attorneys' offices is that they are
divisions of the Department of Justice like the more familiar Civil, Criminal,
Civil Rights and Antitrust Divisions. Although U.S. Attorneys were created
by the Judiciary Act of 1789,2 it was not until the formation of the Department of Justice in 1870 that the Attorney General had the resources to undertake careful supervision of their activities. 3 This long period of independence
left a legacy of local autonomy which sustained efforts by the Department
during the intervening century have only partially mitigated.4 Eisenstein
maintains that this situation has produced a tension which has been one of
the critical factors influencing Department - U.S. Attorney relations, even
though the United States Code vests undisputed authority to supervise U.S.
Attorneys in the Attorney General. 5 Further, U.S. Attorneys are unique
from other field personnel in the federal government in that they select their
own personnel, structure tleir own offices, allocate their own manpower resources and may be removed only by the President 4 In addition, the support
of important officeholders such as U.S. Senators, coupled with prosecutorial
discretion and dose ties to the district,7 produces a greater degree of freedom
of action than in other field office heads. Nevertheless, there are significant
limits on U.S. Attorney freedom of action, especially in terms of lack of staff,
insufficient financial resources, and inexperienced assistants.
Bisenstein hypothesizes that there are five major areas in which U.S.
Attorneys have their principal impact. One major dimension relates to the
direction and effectiveness of federal law enforcement. Armed with discretion
as is any other prosecutor, the U.S. Attorney: determines the ground rules
for federal prosecutions in that district by establishing internal policies concerning which violations will not be prosecuted, and which cases will be
accorded high priority in the allocation of resources. 8 A second area of in2. Currently, the statutory provisions relating to the office are found in 28 U.S.C.
§§541-550 (1970).
3. On the formation of the Department of Justice, see L. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE 3-53 (1967). For some interesting analysis of the Department in recent decades,
see generally J. ELLIFF, CRIME, DISSENT, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE JusncE DEPARTMENT IN THE 1960'S (1971); V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE (1971); R. HARRIS, JusTcE: THE
CRIsiS OF LAw, ORDER AND FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1970).
4. In reference to exerting more centralized control over the U.S. Attorneys' prosecu-

torial responsibilities, see Heinberg, Centralization in Federal Prosecutions, 15 Mo. L.
Ray. 244 (1950). For more general studies pertaining to the efforts of the Department to
centralize federal legal responsibilities within its own hands, see generally H. CUMMINGS &
C. MAcFAR,4ND, FEDERAL JUSTICE (1937); Swisher, Federal Organization of Legal Functions, 33
AM. POL. Sc. REY. 973 (1939).
5. The author incorrectly cites 28 US.C. §507(b) (1970) as establishing this authority.
J. EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U. S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL
SYSTEMS 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as EISENSTEIN]. However, this provision was revised
in 1966 along with other sections of Title 28 relating to the Department of Justice. The
Attorney General's grant of authority over U.S. Attorneys is now found in 28 U.S.C. §519

(1970).
6. 28 U.S.C. §541(c) (1970).
7. 28 US.C. §541(a) (1970).
8. For example, Eisenstein found great variation between districts as to the attention
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fluence, of less significance, is in reference to federal civil cases. These cases
which account for approximately forty percent of the workload of a U.S.
Attorneys office, include categories such as torts, tax, land condemnation and
debt collection- fields of little real policy impact. Far more significant is
Eisenstein's third sphere, the "quality and public image of federal justice."
As the primary federal law enforcement agency in the district, the U.S.
Attorney's office embodies the professionalism and integrity of the federal
government, which many U.S. Attorneys consider to be a primary responsibility.
Eisenstein found that a fourth area of influence is upon local law enforcement agencies. Possessed of excellent information and prestige, some U.S.
Attorneys consciously undertake the role of chief law enforcement official in
their district and try to raise the quality of local criminal law enforcement.
Finally, U.S. Attorneys can affect areas beyond the limits of the legal system
per se. They may take public positions on important topics of policy, work
closely to keep Senators informed of local developments, and even inject
themselves into the policymaking process of client agencies, such as the
Small Business Administration, which depend on their legal representation.
Eisenstein includes a very valuable discussion on the appointment process
for U.S. Attorneys. Basic requirements include residence within the district,
ability to withstand Senate scrutiny, and usually the sharing of party membership with the President. Four key variables interact to shape the appointment environment for an individual nominee: identity of Senators from
the district's state, the point in the evolution of an administration when the
appointment is to be made, the nature of the district itself, and any unique
circumstances, such as a scandal having touched a predecessor, which may
arise in reference to a particular district. Of these factors, timing is especially
significant. Eisenstein maintains that the earlier in a new administration the
appointment is made, the stronger the potential for using the appointment
to discharge campaign patronage obligations; the older an administration becomes, the less influence this factor exerts. Influential figures in the appointment process include the Deputy Attorney General, local and state political
actors, the nominees themselves, and federal judges. Federal judges can
temporarily fill vacancies, 9 thereby strengthening the administration's hand
in dealing with recalcitrant Senators. Additionally, it is absolutely essential
that the nominee be capable of developing a good working relationship with
federal judges in the district.
Eisenstein also directs his attention to the prior careers of the appointees
and their activities after leaving office, considering U.S. Attorneys holding
office between 1961 and 1978. He finds uniformity in certain modal characteristics such as being male, having a substantial record of prior political
and governmental experience, and exhibiting a relatively high socioeconomic
status. But interestingly enough, groups which are usually underrepresented
in other bodies of political appointees, such as Catholics and Jews, were
present more frequently than would be expected. In Eisenstein's survey of
and resources devoted to prosecution of interstate automobile theft under the Dyer Act.
EISENSTEIN, stipra note 5, at 21.
9.

28 U.S.C. §546 (1970).
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subsequent careers, two findings are of particular interest: fully one eighth of
U.S. Attorneys holding office between 1961 and 1973 became federal judges;
seventeen percent went on to hold important political posts after their
terms were concluded. Eisenstein cites this data as but another example of
the dose relationship between the office and the political process.
The real core of the volume deals with the mutual perceptions of U.S.
Attorneys and the Department of Justice. A consistent theme of analysis is
that U.S. Attorneys have substantially greater autonomy than other govern10
ment employees in field office situations. Given this condition, potential
for conflict between the U.S. Attorney's offices and the Department of Justice
arises, as each side tries to expand its own control and decrease the influence
of the other. Eisenstein's insights are particularly valuable since they are
drawn substantially from interviews with both sides. The interviews indicate
that the Department believes there should be a national policy governing
the U.S. Attorneys' offices as well as the rest of the Department, that the
Department should formulate such policy and control litigation to insure uniformity, and although total control from Washington is not feasible, the De-

partment's specialized divisions must be able to enforce adherence to their
policies. Department attorneys see themselves as specialists, while perceiving
the U.S. Attorneys offices as parochial and narrow in perspective. U.S.
Attorneys cannot be fired by the Attorney General, although their assistants
can," and other means of central control are not as complete as the Department would like. Clearly, there is scepticism about whether the local offices
will willingly implement central policy. The need for uniformity on the
one hand, coupled with the suspicion of unenthusiastic cooperation on the
other, can generate resentment on the part of Department attorneys.
Perceptions of the Department influence the behavior of U.S. Attorneys.
While Eisenstein found general agreement with the proposition that a
central policy must emanate from the Attorney General, there was substantial
variation as to the appropriate extent of control to be exercised. Eisenstein
suggests three models of U.S. Attorneys' offices: the "field office," representing
dose adherence to departmental policy, a middle position, and an autonomous
model that seeks to diminish central direction as much as possible. Resentment stems from the efforts of the Department to control behavior through
supervision and directives, the "bureaucratic" nature of the Department
which dictates that time be wasted on paperwork, and the failure to keep
the U.S. Attorney fully apprised of all departmental activities within his
district.
Eisenstein develops a highly effective analysis encompassing the dynamics
of and strategies affecting interaction between the Department and U.S.
Attorneys. Very little of this interaction can be characterized as overt conflict, confrontation, or coercion. In fact, outright resistance and the airing
of disputes in the press are infrequent. Rather, there appears to be a constant
10. For comparative studies of field office autonomy, see J. DAVIS &K. DOLBEARE, LrrrLE
GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE SELCTIVE SERVICE SYSMM (1968); H. KAUrMAN, THE FOREST
RANGER, A STaY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1960).

11. 28 U.s.c. §5M (1970).
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process where U.S. Attorneys seek to preserve through various strategies what
they consider to be the proper degree of autonomy for their offices. Strategies
which are employed include developing a reputation for competence and
integrity, restricting the flow of information to the Department, preserving
select areas as autonomous while allowing the Department greater control
in others, and cultivating support among judges and other influential political

figures. At the same time, the Department can seek to develop cooperation
by reducing the isolation of U.S. Attorneys. It may reduce this isolation by
inviting the U.S. Attorneys to conferences and advocacy institutes, maintaining contact through the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and assigning
Washington attorneys to work in local offices on a long-term basis. The

U.S. Attorney's Manual outlines such procedures which the Department
hopes will be uniformly followed. Although a certain amount of specialized
litigation can be supervised from Washington, in situations of serious strain
the Department can dispatch attorneys to assume control of litigation or
simply wait for a recalcitrant appointee to leave office.
An intriguing question is why conflict does not develop more frequently
between the Department and U.S. Attorneys. Furthermore, many appointees
see the Department's assistance and involvement as being helpful, since their
own resources are limited. Moreover, the Department can perform a buffer
or "heat shield" function, taking the flak for U.S. Attorney actions which
are highly unpopular in the district.12 The Department may also boost the
position of U.S. Attorneys by insisting that all matters relating to their
districts be discussed first with them rather than with the Washington office.
And of course, for U.S. Attorneys with further federal career ambitious,
particularly those interested in federal judgeships, maintaining good relations with the Department is essential.1 3 It also appears that the Department
can be particularly successful in gaining cooperation if it can demonstrate
how a particular decision implements an established national policy or that
the weight of legal scholarship sustains its position. In short, many significant
factors encourage cooperation rather than conflict.
From assessing these patterns of interaction, Eisenstein concludes that
there are four basic district models. The "normal" district manifests low
conflict with the Department, vests a large degree of discretion in the U.S.
Attorney, but leaves to the Department control over major policy areas. The
"'controlled" and "field office" patterns display much greater levels of de.ference to and control by the Department. Finally, the "office in conflict"
represents the situation of bitter dissention and continued confrontation
with the Department.:" Eisenstein identifies three key variables as providing an
12. A prime example of this phenomenon was civil rights cases in the South. For
an effective analysis of federal enforcement in one Mississippi county, see F. WMT,Poarrics
OF SOUTHERN EQUALITY 72-116 (1970).
13. On federal judicial selection, see H. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTMENT
PROCESS (1972); J. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 29-42 (1955).
14. Eisenstein suggests that for a number of unique reasons, the U.S. Attorney's office
for the Southern District of New York constitutes its own individual "semi-autonomous"
district. EISENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 108.
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explanation for the variation between districts. First, the personality and
objectives of the appointee are significant in determining relations with the
Department. Eisenstein's research indicates that egotistical, iron-willed and
policy-oriented appointees are prime candidates for resisting departmental
control. A second important factor is the amount of support an appointee
has from significant political and legal officials, such as Senators and judges.
Finally, the single most significant variable appears to be the size of the
office; the larger it is, the more likely it will achieve autonomy. The greater
resources of a larger office and the need to devote full attention to administration, make the appointee more conscious of policy and more sensitive to
maintaining autonomy. Eisenstein suggests that these variations between
districts and the overall level of autonomy, are greater for the U.S. Attorney
than for any other field office situation in the federal government. He hypothesizes that further gains in Department control will come very slowly and
with great difficulty.
Eisenstein devotes a chapter to the critical relationship between U.S.
Attorneys and judges. Three models are suggested: partnership, dominated,
and the standard pattern, exemplified by moderation on both sides. Many
of the same variables that relate to Department - U.S. Attorney relations
play a role here: personality, career goals, and expectations toward the
proper role of each party. Most U.S. Attorneys seek to maintain good relations by establishing credibility and expertise, being cooperative and helpful,
and manifesting professionalism. A particularly important factor is that federal
judges are very frequently former U.S. Attorneys. But again, the single most
important variable is the size of the district. The larger it is, the more judges
compose the bench and thus, the power of any single judge is correspondingly
diluted.
While Eisenstein concludes that judges dominate in their interaction with
the appointees, U.S. Attorneys are not without significant influence of their
own. In suits for writs of mandamus and other litigation directed against
the judge, the U.S. Attorney defends the action. In addition, as the largest
single litigator in a district court, the U.S. Attorney can aid the judge in
keeping his docket current. Every case settled is one less requiring trial. However, it is also evident that judges' preferences affect which cases will be
brought; cases that a judge believes unworthy of attention result in minimal
prosecution. Judges control vital decisions such as motions, scheduling, and
sentencing which affects management of the U.S. Attorney's office workload.
Obviously sentencing patterns also influence the kind of plea bargaining
that occurs.
Eisenstein also discusses interaction between U.S. Attorneys and investigative agencies, client agencies, and opposing counsel Like any prosecutor, the
U.S. Attorney sits at the center of a web of such mutual relationships. The
U.S. Attorney relies upon investigative agencies, such as the FBI, much like
any local prosecutor depends upon police investigation. These agencies in
turn need the U.S. Attorney to prosecute the cases they develop.' 5 Eisenstein
15. Tor seminal work employing this "exchange model" to explain behavior at the
local police and prosecutorial level, see G. COLE, PoLrMCs AND TH AMnNusrrATION oF
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describes the tactics and strategies whereby each side in turn influences the
other. The most important consideration, however, is the need to win cases;
thus, maintaining good relations is crucial. With civil client agencies, Eisenstein found less significant interaction than with the investigative units,
because generally the Department has a much greater role than the U.S.
Attorney in civil litigation. Eisenstein also examines the U.S. Attorneys' relationships with private attorneys. Particularly important here is the role
played by the local bar in establishing the reputation of the U.S. Attorney's
office. This reputation affects the office's success in litigation and its credibility
in negotiating settlements and pleas. Especially if future judicial appointment is an objective, the U.S. Attorney must effectively demonstrate his
competence and at the same time avoid alienating leaders of the local bar.
Eisenstein's brief discussion of plea bargaining is an especially valuable
contribution. 16 In contrast with local law enforcement, the focus of nearly
all existing studies,' 7 plea bargaining on the federal level is rare. Ironically,
the major bargaining device is the reduction of the number of counts, which
is the device least utilized on the local level. As to why attorneys accept such
minimal advantage in return for guilty pleas, Eisenstein suggests that likely
motives are fear of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, suspicion
that judges may impose harsher sentences upon those demanding a full trial,
or desire to plead out of a hopeless case. It is significant that the typical federal
case is far stronger and better prepared than most local cases, which encourages bargaining. In contrast to the local prosecutor, the U.S. Attorney
cannot recommend sentences. However, he is not under intense pressure as is
the local prosecutor to reduce his backlog of cases, and therefore, can afford
to make generous bargains. Hopefully, this suggestive work by Eisenstein
will cause more attention to be given to federal plea bargaining than has
been given in the past.
Eisenstein devotes his concluding chapter to a summary and assessment
of his research. One of the most striking aspects is the documentation of the
very close ties between the U.S. Attorney and the local district. In many ways,
U.S. Attorneys are like federal judges in the South during the civil rights
revolution-so integrated with the district that it is somewhat ironic to
vest in them the responsibility for implementing national policy.' Eisenstein
is extremely hesitant to draw any firm conclusions about the impact of the
various pressures upon U.S. Attorneys. His "impressionistic data" leads to
the conclusion that the vast preponderance of cases are routine and do not
JUSTICE

(1973). See also Clark, Legal and Judicial Studies: Some Areas of Current Interest,

8 POLITY 580, 585-88 (1976).
16. See also S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM
120-28 (1971). For probably the best brief discussion on federal prosecutorial discretion
and the considerations that guide its exercise, see generally Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REv. 174 (1965). For an outstanding book-length study,
see F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1969).
17. For an effective introduction to the complexities of plea bargaining and the contrasting values involved, see J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 388-437 (1973).
18.

See Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South, 28 J.

POL. 337 (1964).
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generate conflicting pressures. Partisan considerations are most apt to develop
in cases involving either prominent individuals, such as Patty Hearst, or
matters that "affect the political fortunes of officials and political parties,"' 9
as in the case of Spiro Agnew. 20
The greatest single problem facing U.S. Attorneys is the lack of experience and constant turnover of their staff. Eisenstein rejects the frequently
made proposal to place these offices under career civil service, suggesting that
the disadvantage of permanent installation of the mediocre would more than
offset any advantage resulting from continuity of service by the competent.
Extracting commitments to remain with the Department four or five years, a
highly unrealistic proposal which would undoubtedly result in discouraging
most potential applicants from considering such service, and better salaries,
are suggested as more attractive alternatives.
Professor Eisenstein has written a book of significant value for lawyers,
social scientists and others who desire to probe into the critical role played
by U.S. Attorneys. While the author has not undertaken to assess the performance of U.S. Attorneys, his book sets forth some provocative theories
about how U.S. Attorneys discharge their responsibilities, interact with other
significant legal and political figures, and direct the operation of their offices.
Hopefully, others will build upon Eisenstein's pioneering work by undertaking their own studies of U.S. Attorneys. There are some problems with the
book such as the heavy reliance on interview data gathered from 1965 to
1967 and 1970 to 1971, manifesting some degree of "staleness." Eisenstein
also has a tendency to be wordy; more economy of language would have
been highly beneficial. He also seems overly cautious occasionally in drawing
conclusions. 21 Nonetheless, Eisenstein has written a volume which employs
fundamental social science techniques and is not obscured by mysterious
jargon or complicated mathematics, a book which is nearly as easy for lawyers
to understand as for social scientists. This is no minor achievement, given
the continuing need to promote cross-disciplinary interaction between lawyers
and social scientists. The work stands as the first sustained analysis of U.S.
Attorneys, full of perceptive insights and thoughtful conclusions, clearly
written, based in large measure upon significant original research, and
suggesting some most interesting theories about the reasons behind the
manner in which U.S. Attorneys' offices function.

P. H. CrAK**
19. EISENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 206.
20. See R. COHEN & J. WrrcovxR, A HEARTEAT AWAY: THE
TION OF VIcE PRESIENT SPIRO T. AGNEW (1974).

INVESTIGATION AND RESIGNA-

21. Unfortunately, like many other publishers, Johns Hopkins University Press has
elected to place the extremely valuable footnotes at the end of the volume, thereby seriously
diminishing the opportunity to integrate them into the reading of each chapter.
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